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In a recent action the owner of a li-
censed Puerto Rican gambling casino
sought to recover gambling debts incurred
by the defendant in Puerto Rico. This type
of contractual debt (I.O.U.) is both valid
and enforceable under Puerto Rican law.
The appellate division ruled that the for-
eign right was unenforceable because it vio-
lated the public policy of New York. The
Court of Appeals, reversing in a five to
two decision, held that a contract based on
licensed gambling transactions, and en-
forceable where made, is neither morally
unacceptable per se, nor objectionable
under the prevailing standards of social
conduct in the state. Intercontinental
Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9,
203 N.E.2d 210, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527
(1964).
The validity of a contract is generally
determined by the law of the jurisdiction
wherein it was made, and if the contract is
found valid, it will be enforced by the
courts of New York.1 There is, however,
a well-established exception to this rule.
An action cannot be maintained if enforce-
ment of the contract would violate the pub-
lic policy of the forum. 2
The phrase "public policy" may connote
the common law or general statutory law
of the state.3 It may also mean the pre-
vailing notions of justice and the funda-
mental conceptions of right and wrong
1 F.A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 254
N.Y. 407, 414, 173 N.E. 564, 567 (1930).
2 Ibid.
3 Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15 (1917); see Glaser v.
Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296, 12 N.E.2d 305 (1938).
found in the society as a whole. In the
past, when the courts have used the phrase,
it has not been entirely clear which con-
ception of public policy they were employ-
ing. One of the classic definitions of pub-
lic policy, as applied to the enforceability
of foreign contract rights, was adopted by
Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co.' He stated that
the courts are not free to refuse to en-
force a foreign right at the pleasure of the
judges, to suit the individual notion of ex-
pediency or fairness. They do not close their
doors unless help would violate some funda-
mental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, some deep-
rooted tradition of the common weal.5
However, the question remains whether a
foreign contract which is illegal in New
York can still be said not to violate our
public policy.
The problem of defining public policy
has frequently been encountered in cases
involving the enforcement of contracts
arising from out-of-state gambling transac-
tions. At common law, gambling was not
considered an immoral act, nor was it il-
legal.' Gambling was outlawed and made
a crime when the games tended to become
an incitement to breach of the peace or
constituted a nuisance.' Throughout its en-
tire history, the State of New York has con-
stitutionally prohibited gambling.8 The
4224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
5Id. at 111, 120 N.E. at 202.
6 EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 832 (1959).
7 PETERSON, GAMBLING: SHOULD IT BE LEGAL-
IZED? 136 (1951).
8 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1894); N.Y. PEN. LAW
§ 973. Horse racing and bingo, however, were
authorized by constitutional amendments in 1939
and 1957 respectively for the primary purpose of
revenue raising.
state's founding fathers were of the opin-
ion that gambling was dangerous to the
public morals and that most individuals
could not afford to lose without their fami-
lies suffering a resulting hardship.5
Casino gambling, as found in the instant
case, has always been, and is today, illegal
in New York.10 Yet actions based on gam-
bling transactions entered into in another
state have, in the past, been sustained
though contrary to the policy of this state.
In 1854, the court of appeals in Thatcher
v. Morris" held that while under our law
contracts based on a lottery were illegal,
the contracts were nevertheless enforce-
able in the New York courts if based on a
valid and legal obligation made without
the state. The court reasoned that since
the contract was valid where made, it
should be enforced under rules of comity.
The contract was held inoffensive to our
public policy and not contrary to the gen-
eral morality of the people of New York
even if contrary to our penal statutes.12
The question of gambling and public
policy was again considered in the case of
Harris v. White. 13 In that case, a suit was
allowed by a jockey for wages earned in
out-of-state horse races, although all stake-
racing was, at that time, outlawed in New
York. Reasoning that New York's domes-
tic policy against this activity could have
no extra-territorial effect, the court took
the position that stake-racing, although de-
clared illegal in New York, was not such
9 Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the
Convention of 1821, p. 567.
10 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1894); N.Y. PEN. LAW
§ 973.
" 11 N.Y. 437 (1854).
12 Id. at 438. See Kentucky v. Bassford & Nones,
6 Hill 526 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844).
13 81 N.Y. 532 (1880).
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an inherently unlawful thing as to be vio-
lative of our public policy.
In contrast to these early cases which
allowed enforcement of out-of-state con-
tracts based on various forms of gambling
is the lower court case of Neilsen v. Don-
nelly, 14 decided in 1920. In that case, a
municipal court judge refused to allow an
action to recover the amount of a wager
made upon a legal horse race in Louisiana.
The court concluded that, since our con-
stitution and penal statutes specifically
outlawed wagers dependent upon any race,
they expressed our public policy and the
contract was consequently unenforceable.
The court looked to the gambling trans-
action on which the contract was based
and stated that "the courts of no state will
uphold contracts which are deemed to be
injurious to the public rights of the people,
offensive to their morals or in contraven-
tion of public law." 15
Historically then, there has been some
conflict in defining public policy vis- -vis
gambling. The more restrictive view was
that if the act on which the contract was
based violated our statute, it was violative
of our public policy. The other view was
that the transaction must necessarily be
contrary to general morality before it
would contravene public policy, regardless
of statute law. The older cases do not stand
for the proposition that all out-of-state
gambling, of any type, would violate our
public policy.
These cases appear to be limited to the
specific issues of lottery and horse racing.
The question still to be decided is that of
casino gambling and our public policy.
14 110 Misc. 266, 181 N.Y. Supp. 509 (N.Y. City
Munic. Ct. 1920).
15 Id. at 269, 181 N.Y. Supp. at 511.
RECENT DECISIONS
That type of gambling is quite a different
thing from a lottery used to raise revenue
for the state, and horse racing which is still
considered by many to be a sport.
In the instant case, a majority of the
Court of Appeals reasoned that all for-
eign-based rights should be enforced un-
less such enforcement would amount to ap-
proval of a "transaction which is inherently
vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking
to the prevailing moral sense."' 16 After the
Court applied this test of public policy, it
held that legalized gambling, as found in
Puerto Rico, would be acceptable by the
New York courts as not contrary to our
public policy.
Relying on the nineteenth century
gambling contract cases alluded to previ-
ously, the Court was of the opinion that it
was an historical fact "even in Victorian
times that there was no strong public policy
to prevent the enforcement of such con-
tracts."' 7 The fact that under New York
law the acts committed by plaintiff were il-
legal was held to be of minor importance.
The Court did not believe it was proper
to apply our domestic law to decisions
which should be governed by the law of
another jurisdiction.
In clarifying what is meant by "public
policy," the majority stated that it is not
to be determined by mere reference to the
laws of the forum. The prevailing social
and moral attitudes of the community
should be given substantial consideration.
This being the case, the Court looked to
the legislation legalizing pari-mutuel bet-
ting and bingo. This coupled with the
10 Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15
N.Y.2d 9, 13, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212, 254 N.Y.S.2d
527, 529 (1964).
'7 Id. at 14, 203 N.E.2d at 212, 254 N.Y.S.2d at
530.
popular movement to legalize off-track
betting appeared to be indicative of the
community's growing acceptance of li-
censed gambling as a morally acceptable
activity. 8
One of the basic objections to enforc-
ing the plaintiff's claim in this case was
that it was based on "I.O.U.'s" which were
incurred while gambling. The ability to
give notes to cover these losses could very
well lead to an individual's losing far more
than he could ever afford. However, the
majority placed great stress on the fact
that under Puerto Rican law provision is
made for courts to reduce gambling debts
or decline to enforce them at all." This
power is discretionary with the court and
can be exercised if the losses are too large
in comparison with the customs of a good
family man.2 0 Stating that since a New
York court would have the same discre-
tion in enforcing the Puerto Rican con-
tract, the court reasoned that the indi-
vidual could be protected from excessive
losses and the unfairness or other dangers
found in unauthorized gambling. This
would be in conformity with the under-
lying policy of our anti-gambling statutes.
This "safety valve" aspect of Puerto Rican
law was a major factor militating against
holding the gambling contract in question
violative of our public policy. 21
The minority would give a somewhat
more limited interpretation of the public
18 Id. at 14-15, 203 N.E.2d at 212-13, 254 N.Y.S.
2d at 530-3 1.
19 id. at 15, 203 N.E.2d at 213, 254 N.Y.S.2d at
531. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 4774 (1955).
Puerto Rican law would govern this case under
the general rule of contracts that the validity




policy of the state. It was their contention
that the law of New York has always
looked at the gambler as an outlaw, and
considered the operation of a gambling
house a crime. This historic fact is so in-
dicative of New York's public policy that
our courts must be closed to the type of
suit herein involved. The very facts that
casino gambling is today outlawed and the
contract, if made here, would likewise be
illegal, clearly express New York's public
policy and therefore all other considera-
tions are irrelevant.
The legalization of pari-mutuel betting
and bingo is not believed to indicate a
trend; rather the people of this state have
differentiated between these forms of gam-
bling and the kind here in question. The
minority underlines its position by empha-
sizing the fact that while pari-mutuel bet-
ting and bingo are legal in many states,
only one state (Nevada) licenses gambling
casinos.2 -' The conclusion of the minority
was that the operation of a gambling house
is definitely contrary to New York's public
policy and that our courts should refuse
'2 Id. at 19, 203 N.E.2d at 215, 254 N.Y.S.2d at
534. Even in Nevada gambling debts cannot be
the basis for a valid lawsuit. Nevada Tax Comm.
v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 310 P.2d 852 (1957).
Homosexuality-A New
Ground for Annulment?
Plaintiff petitioned the court to annul
the marriage of her deceased niece to the
defendant. Petitioner alleged that the de-
fendant had induced his wife to enter the
marriage by fraudulently misrepresenting
his age, origin, ancestry and his intent to
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plaintiff's claim regardless of comity or
principles of the law of contracts.
The instant case defines those factors
which will be given consideration by the
courts in determining our state's public
policy. The public policy of this state is
not determinable by mere reference to our
domestic laws. The legality or illegality of
the activity upon which the foreign right is
based is not to be given sole considera-
tion. Courts must now look beyond a lit-
eral interpretation of the law, and give cog-
nizance to the prevailing "social and moral
attitudes of the community."23
Under the concept of public policy ad-
vanced by the instant case, it would seem
that all foreign-based contractual rights, if
valid where made, are entitled to enforce-
ment in New York unless inherently hein-
ous or clearly violative of our basic moral
tenets, the obvious example of which
would be a contract to commit a crime.
Aside from this obvious case, the problem
arises as to exactly how and by what means
a court is to determine the prevailing moral
attitude of the members of a community
on any given question.
23 Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, supra
note 16, at 14, 203 N.E.2d at 212, 254 N.Y.S.2d at
530-31.
have normal sexual relations, in addition
to concealing the fact that he was a homo-
sexual. The allegation that the defendant
concealed the fact that he was a homo-
sexual was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence, while the other factual issues
presented to the jury were resolved in
favor of annulment. The Appellate Divi-
